Interview with George Anderson, 1986

Item Information

Title:
Interview with George Anderson, 1986
Description:
Admiral George Anderson was the Chief of Naval Operations from 1961-1963. In his interview he describes the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 from the Navy’s perspective. At the time, his initial reaction to the Soviet missile emplacement was that the United States should reply with “tremendous force,” even though he acknowledges it would have been “a little presumptuous” to think the Soviets would not have launched missiles in retaliation. Even so, he contends that it was necessary to “balance” the inability to neutralize every Soviet missile with the consequences of “subsequent events,” by which he means Cuban activities in the hemisphere and in Africa. If the US had invaded and “straightened the whole mess in Cuba out,” it would have “avoided a lot of subsequent difficulties.” Nevertheless, he gives President Kennedy high marks for his handling of the crisis, saying that he “operated as a president should,” including listening to his advisers, evaluating all information, and ensuring that a military operation was absolutely necessary before giving the order to act. Admiral Anderson explains the decision-making process that led to the Cuba blockade. He also gives a sense of what Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings were like and describes the Navy’s operations in carrying out the blockade. One of the lessons he draws from the crisis is the need to keep civilian authorities informed of the action but without letting them interfere with military operations. Repeatedly expressing pride in the Navy’s performance, he notes for example its success in forcing Soviet subs to the surface during the quarantine. Denying that those actions were provocative, he adds that “if they had been nuclear subs ... it would have been more complicated.” A repeated focus of the interview is Anderson’s turbulent relationship with Secretary of Defense McNamara and his negative assessment of McNamara’s personal traits, which he says made him unsuited for the position. He briefly mentions the circumstances surrounding his own removal as CNO, which he attributes to McNamara. Reflecting on the crisis, he concludes that Khrushchev backed down solely because he knew he faced superior force. Although he reports that the Air Force was ready to deploy nuclear weapons provided the Soviets chose to use them first, he notes that “the world would be a lot better off if we ... scrapped them all.”
Interviewee:
Anderson, George Whelan, 1906-1992
Date:
March 19, 1986
Format:
Film/Video
Location:
WGBH
Collection (local):
WGBH Open Vault
Series:
War and Peace in the Nuclear Age
Subjects:
Soviet Union
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
United States. Navy
Nitze, Paul H.
International relations
Gates, Thomas S.
LeMay, Curtis E.
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Nuclear weapons
Gilpatric, Roswell L. (Roswell Leavitt), 1906-1996
Lemnitzer, Lyman L. (Lyman Louis), 1899-1988
McCone, John A. (John Alex), 1902-1991
Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 1894-1971
McNamara, Robert S., 1916-2009
Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917-1963
Batista y Zaldivar, Fulgencio, 1901-1973
Castro, Fidel, 1926-
Places:
Cuba
United States
Extent:
01:11:41:11
Link to Item:
https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_2E5DD68D9B41475A8F5156D9E0E10B4A
Terms of Use:
Rights status not evaluated.
Contact host institution for more information.
Publisher:
WGBH Educational Foundation
Identifier:
V_2E5DD68D9B41475A8F5156D9E0E10B4A