Gene La Rocque was a career naval officer who worked in the Strategic Plans Directorate of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 1950s. He retired as a rear admiral. In the interview he recalls that during the Qemoy and Matsu crisis of 1958, the Navy discovered that its aircraft carriers had gradually converted to nuclear armaments, which meant that the U.S. could not have waged a significant conventional war if called upon. This was partly a function of the view that the Soviet Union was the United States only serious enemy. In addition, most in the military simply believed it was a good idea to acquire as many nuclear weapons as possible. He acknowledges that he and other planners, including John Eisenhower, the presidents son, agreed that nuclear arms were going to be a permanent feature and therefore should be built into U.S. war plans. He goes on to explain the relationships between the branches of the military, each of which vied for preeminence and believed it could win a war without the other branches. For its part, the Navys tactic was to make its nuclear submarines dual purpose, allowing them to handle the needs of both strategic bombing and naval warfare, so that the Strategic Air Command would not be able to take over its forces. Adm. La Rocque also explains President Eisenhowers relationship with the military. He notes the latters largely unconstrained access to weapons procurement during the 1950s, backed strongly by the likes of John Foster Dulles and occurring to some degree without the full awareness of President Eisenhower. He then compares that era to the militarys relationship with Secretary of Defense McNamara, who came in and said enough is enough.