James Schlesinger served as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1971-1973, Director of Central Intelligence for several months in 1973, Secretary of Defense from 1973-1975 and Secretary of Energy from 1977-1979. In this second interview, he opens by assessing the impact of parity, namely that it made irrelevant the doctrine of massive retaliation, and raised doubts about the U.S. ability to defend Europe. The conversation turns to the so-called Schlesinger doctrine of expanding nuclear options, followed by a discussion of the NATO stockpile and his attempts to modernize it, including developing the controversial neutron bomb. At the time, he explains, the Europeans were generally more amenable to America taking the lead on nuclear decisions. He declares his lack of concern over the absence of American intermediate-range weapons in Europe in the early 1970s, even though he acknowledges that a great deal of time was spent brooding about Soviet capabilities in that area. The development of the SS-20 quickly eroded American confidence that their overall capabilities could compensate for a local monopoly of that kind. He goes on to relate the difficulties between Helmut Schmidt and Jimmy Carter, which manifested themselves at this time. The discussion then migrates to various aspects of the American security guarantee, including as reflected in the debate over intermediate missiles (the American deployment being mostly a political move) and against the later backdrop of Reykjavik. He is surprised at the degree of European concern over the INF agreement, though he points back to Reykjavik as part of the reason. He closes with a comment about Germanys tendency to overrate its singularity.