Interview with Denis Healey, 1986

Item Information

Title:
Interview with Denis Healey, 1986
Description:
Denis Healey was the British secretary of state for defense from 1964 to 1970 and chancellor of the exchequer from 1974 to 1979. In his interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: “The Education of Robert McNamara,” Healey begins with a comparison between Soviet and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conventional military strength. He reflects on the period in which he was defense secretary under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. He recalls the opposing interests of Germany and the United States with regard to nuclear strategy, explains his “Healey theorem” of deterrence, and clarifies France’s position that alliances can’t coexist with nuclear weapons. Healey also assesses U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara’s quest for tidy solutions to “insoluble” nuclear problems. Healey elaborates on France’s opposition to the notion of “extended deterrence” and on his own role in persuading NATO to adopt “flexible response” strategy. He traces the evolution of his military analysis of massive retaliation, describes his collaboration with McNamara in developing flexible-response doctrine, reiterates the expectation that SALT III would follow shortly after a ratified SALT II Treaty, and shares how he ultimately lost faith in flexible response. He also discusses the extraordinary growth of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, Britain’s response to the proposal for a Multilateral Force in the early 1960s, German chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s distrust of U.S. president Jimmy Carter, and his own opposition to U.S. Euro-strategic missiles. As a fellow defense intellectual, Healey was encouraged by national security adviser Henry Kissinger’s appointment: he was sure that détente could move forward. He admired Kissinger’s boldness in dodging “all official channels which he doesn’t like anybody else doing,” but he was disappointed by Kissinger’s failure to consult with allies. For the future, Healey believes that there should be fifty-percent reductions in strategic and conventional weapons, particularly when “one side or the other has superiority.” He also advocates a “nuclear-free corridor” to avoid accidental war.
Interviewee:
Healey, Denis
Date:
October 27, 1986
Format:
Film/Video
Location:
WGBH
Collection (local):
WGBH Open Vault
Series:
War and Peace in the Nuclear Age
Subjects:
Deterrence (Strategy)
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II
Massive retaliation (Nuclear strategy)
Nuclear weapons
Soviet Union
Detente
Tactical nuclear weapons
Great Britain
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Warfare, Conventional
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nuclear arms control
Nuclear warfare
Multilateral force (Nuclear strategy)
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Flexible response (Nuclear strategy)
Taylor, Maxwell D. (Maxwell Davenport), 1901-1987
Wilson, Harold, 1916-1995
Richardson, Elliot L., 1920-1999
Kissinger, Henry, 1923-
Soviet Union. Treaties, etc. United States, 1972 May 26 (ABM), 1972 May 26 (ABM)
McNamara, Robert S., 1916-2009
Carter, Jimmy, 1924-
Schmidt, Helmut, 1918 Dec. 23-
Sandys, Duncan, 1908-1987
Places:
England > London
Germany
Afghanistan
France
United States
Extent:
00:47:15:06
Link to Item:
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_841B5BEC550448C381A8671A805C7AC4
Terms of Use:
Rights status not evaluated.
Contact host institution for more information.
Publisher:
WGBH Educational Foundation
Identifier:
V_841B5BEC550448C381A8671A805C7AC4