Interview with Andrei Gromyko, 1988

Item Information

Title:
Interview with Andrei Gromyko, 1988
Description:
Andrei Gromyko was Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1957-1985 and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet from 1985-1988. In the interview, he recalls the moment President Truman informed Joseph Stalin of the existence of the atomic bomb at the Potsdam conference, insisting that Stalin appreciated perfectly the significance of the weapon, contrary to general opinion, but that he chose to behave as if it were not of major import. The Soviets, he insists, opposed the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki because they saw no military need in it, viewing it rather as a "criminal act." He explains Soviet objections to the Baruch Plan, and discusses the Soviet alternative plan, adding his belief that a major opportunity was missed by not coming to any agreement at that time. In his view, the West is to blame for the parting of ways between Moscow and its wartime allies due to a variety of actions, notably their insistence on pressing ahead with the arms race and building American forward bases overseas. Other topics discussed include the Berlin question and NSC-68. Taking up the Korean War, he concludes that its importance was that it taught the need to come to terms by negotiation rather than armed conflict. He denies that Khrushchev ever exaggerated Soviet military capabilities. He then goes on to discuss the Cuban missile crisis in detail, including his meeting with President Kennedy on October 18, 1962, in which he insists the president never asked directly about Soviet missiles in Cuba. The chief lesson he draws from that crisis is that no nation should impose a regime on another that is not acceptable to the population of the latter. Turning to the Nixon and Ford administrations, he goes describes the Soviet views on linkage, the SALT treaty and the Vladivostok negotiations. He denies the Soviets ever reached full parity with the United States, which leads to a lengthy statement about the arms race. He further remarks that the Soviets were not responsible for the decline of détente. In discussing intermediate-range missiles in Europe he takes issue with the contention that disarmament generally favors the USSR. This in turn leads to a lengthy commentary on the need to abolish nuclear weapons.
Interviewee:
Gromyko, Andrei Andreevich, 1909-1989
Date:
December 13, 1988
Format:
Film/Video
Location:
WGBH
Collection (local):
WGBH Open Vault
Series:
War and Peace in the Nuclear Age
Subjects:
Nagasaki-shi (Japan)--History--Bombardment, 1945
Nuclear arms control
Hiroshima-shi (Japan)--History--Bombardment, 1945
Kurchatov, I. V. (Igor Vasil'evich), 1903-1960
Brezhnev, Leonid Il'ich, 1906-1982
Communism
Great Britain
Soviet Union
United Nations
Nuclear weapons
Detente
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
World War II
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
National Security Council (U.S.)
Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
Gorbachev, Mikhail
Nuclear disarmament
Korean War, 1950-1953
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
International relations
Truman, Harry S., 1884-1972
Adenauer, Konrad, 1876-1967
Baruch, Bernard M. (Bernard Mannes), 1870-1965
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 1904-1967
Churchill, Winston, 1874-1965
Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917-1963
Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 1894-1971
Soviet Union. Treaties, etc. United States, 1972 May 26 (ABM), 1972 May 26 (ABM)
Stalin, Joseph, 1879-1953
Carter, Jimmy, 1924-
Acheson, Dean, 1893-1971
Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913-1994
Kissinger, Henry, 1923-
Places:
Germany
United States
Cuba
Japan
China
Extent:
02:21:45:27
Link to Item:
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_4F61F2AF06974008A3B8C158692613C4
Terms of Use:
Rights status not evaluated.
Contact host institution for more information.
Publisher:
WGBH Educational Foundation
Identifier:
V_4F61F2AF06974008A3B8C158692613C4