Interview with Henry Genrikh Aleksandrovich Trofimenko, 1986

Item Information

Title:
Interview with Henry Genrikh Aleksandrovich Trofimenko, 1986
Description:
Scholar and former journalist for the Russian news agency TASS Genrikh "Henry" Aleksandrovich Trofimenko was chief analyst at the Institute for the U.S. and Canada Studies at the Russian Academy of Science. The interview Trofimenko conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age provides a sweep of Soviet views on everything from the Baruch Plan to regulate the spread of nuclear technology to counterforce strategy that would target military forces instead of cities. He describes Moscow's reactions to the Truman Doctrine and containment policy, the Marshall Plan, and the threat American nuclear strategy posed to a pre-nuclear Soviet Union. He captures the state of mind of a nation that had just lost 20 million people. Its priorities were to rebuild its economy, secure its borders, and gain sufficient military strength to resist the pressure of what Trofimenko calls "one-sided American solutions." The United States was the only nation to emerge prosperous from the war, and it worked to dictate post-war international arrangements. Trofimenko describes the Baruch Plan's aim to maintain the U.S. monopoly over nuclear weapons, and the United States' rejection of the Soviet Union's proposal to ban atomic weaponry altogether. Throughout his interview, Trofimenko lashes out against the United States' drive to stay ahead, which he believes initiated new spirals in "this crazy arms race that leads nowhere." He recalls the relief of his country people when the Soviets detonated the atomic bomb and matched Washington's development of a hydrogen bomb. After Sputnik, he says, they understood that, for the first time, Soviet weapons could strike American soil. In his interview, Trofimenko admires Robert McNamara for his intellect and for the soul-searching that led the defense secretary to rethink the military doctrine he initially advocated. He also credits McNamara with educating the Soviet leadership about how the nuclear age breaks down the distinction between offensive and defensive weapons. The defense secretary's greatest contribution, in Trofimenko's opinion, was to promote a second-strike retaliatory force, which implies renouncing a first strike. Finally, Trofimenko explains that today, Russians have acquiesced to mutual assured destruction only as a means and first step toward deep nuclear reductions that would ultimately guarantee "mutual assured survival."
Interviewee:
Trofimenko, G. A. (Genrikh Aleksandrovich)
Date:
April 1, 1986
Format:
Film/Video
Location:
WGBH
Collection (local):
WGBH Open Vault
Series:
War and Peace in the Nuclear Age
Subjects:
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Edicia Sputnik
Nuclear weapons
World War II
International relations
Nuclear warfare
Mutual assured destruction
Counterforce (Nuclear strategy)
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Nuclear arms control
Hydrogen bomb
Reagan, Ronald
Middle East
Massive retaliation (Nuclear strategy)
Baruch Plan (1946)
Flexible response (Nuclear strategy)
Korean War, 1950-1953
Soviet Union
Gorbachev, Mikhail
First strike (Nuclear strategy)
Strategic Defense Initiative
Deterrence (Strategy)
McCarthy, Joseph, 1908-1957
McNamara, Robert S., 1916-2009
Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (Franklin Delano), 1882-1945
Lilienthal, David Eli, 1899-1981
Places:
Russia
China
Iran
United States
Extent:
01:44:21:27
Link to Item:
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_C0BD3F42C13A4ECE9EAE45D6C703C3AF
Terms of Use:
Rights status not evaluated.
Contact host institution for more information.
Publisher:
WGBH Educational Foundation
Identifier:
V_C0BD3F42C13A4ECE9EAE45D6C703C3AF