creator: Bosworth, Barry
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Investment, and the Level and Distribution of Worker Well-Being
description- – All observers agree that Social Security reform is needed to restore the program's solvency. This paper examines the impact of alternative reforms on Social Security finances, on the wider U.S. economy, and on workers who contribute to and receive benefits from the program. In one reform we consider, Social Security benefits are eventually reduced about one-third so that benefits can be financed with the present 12.4 percent payroll tax rate. Workers are required to contribute an additional 2 percent of their wages to a new defined-contribution pension. We embed Social Security's finances in a neoclassical growth model and show how additions to Social Security and defined-contribution pension reserves, if they are saved, can increase the future growth of productivity and wages and reduce the rate of return on capital. These economy-wide impacts in turn affect the lifetime wages and pensions of workers born in successive generations. They have differing effects on workers depending on workers' relative earnings and the trend in their earnings over their careers. Our model includes a microsimulation component to measure these effects on individual workers. Our findings suggest that scaling back traditional Social Security and replacing part or all of it with defined-contribution pensions can potentially increase national saving over a very lengthy horizon, thus lifting the domestic capital stock and wages. The potential benefits are larger for high-wage workers than for average- and low-wage workers. Because of the potential impact of this reform on the U.S. capital-labor ratio, real capital returns might be adversely affected by this reform, reducing the rate of return workers will obtain in their defined-contribution pension accounts. Our results also imply that generations which will retire before about 2035 would enjoy higher lifetime pensions and net incomes under a policy that maintains Social Security benefits with tax hikes. That is, generations that will retire over the next 30 or 40 years would be better off under a policy that preserves Social Security through tax hikes than under a policy that scales back benefits and partially replaces them with benefits from a new defined-contribution system.
- – 2000-01-01
- – application/pdf
Lifetime Earnings Patterns, the Distribution of Future Social Security Benefits, and the Impact of Pension Reform
description- – This paper describes an analysis of career earnings patterns developed for predicting the impact of Social Security reform. We produce estimates of age-earnings profiles of American men and women born between 1931 and 1960. The estimates are obtained using lifetime earnings records maintained by the Social Security Administration. We use a standard econometric approach to develop forecasts of future individual earnings, and we supplement these estimates by developing estimates of the shape and prevalence of nine stylized earnings patterns of U.S. workers. These two alternative approaches to estimating career earnings patterns have significant advantages over the traditional analytical approach of examining a small number of representative workers who are assumed to have steady earnings throughout their careers. Few workers have level career earnings, so the traditional approach to policy simulation represents a serious distortion of actual labor market experience. Moreover, differences in the pattern of career earnings can produce wide disparities in pension entitlements, even for workers with the same average earnings, under individual account and other retirement plans. Since defined-contribution pension plans are frequently proposed as a supplement or replacement for traditional Social Security, it is important that policy simulation be based on accurate representations of career earnings patterns.
- – 1999-12-01
- – application/pdf
The Trend in Lifetime Earnings Inequality and Its Impact on the Distribution of Retirement Income
description- – This paper examines the trend in career earnings profiles and lifetime earnings inequality using a new data set that links micro-census information from a Census Bureau survey (the Survey of Income and Program Participation, or SIPP) with the summary earnings records (SER) maintained by the Social Security Administration. It then considers the implications of these trends for the trend of Social Security replacement rates and future changes in the inequality of pension income. The data set covers men and women born in successive years between 1926 and 1965 using a combination of observed and predicted earnings. Our analysis finds that aggregate male wage and employment patterns have remained much more stable than is the case for women. Although less educated men in recent birth cohorts have fared worse than men in earlier cohorts who had the same schooling, the increase in average educational attainment has largely offset the employment and relative wage losses suffered by less educated men. Among women, while female employment rates and average earnings remain lower than those of men of the same age, the male-female gap is now much smaller than it was in earlier cohorts. The age pattern of employment and earnings among women is growing more similar to the pattern observed among men. Our tabulations of historical earnings and forecast of future earnings patterns suggest that that lifetime earnings inequality will increase significantly among men. Compared with men born between 1936-1940, we predict that men born in 1961-1965 will experience 12 percent greater inequality in career earnings. Even though women's inequality has increased if we measure inequality among full-time, year-round workers who are employed during a particular year, inequality has fallen sharply if we widen the sample to include all women who are potentially available to work. The rising employment rate of women has increased the percentage of working-age years that women spend in jobs. It has dramatically reduced the fraction of women who earn extremely low lifetime wages because they are employed in only a few years of their potential careers. The noticeable increase in lifetime earnings inequality among men has thus been offset, at least in part, by a sizable reduction in career earnings inequality among women.
- – 2001-08-01
- – application/pdf
Pension Reform in the Presence of Financial Market Risk
description- – As their populations grow older, the industrial countries face steep increases in public pension costs. If countries change their pension systems in advance of sharply higher pension costs, it is possible to prepare for the added retirement costs by funding a portion of the future liabilities through increased saving. By boosting capital formation and economic growth, higher saving has the potential to increase the incomes - and the welfare - of future workers and retirees.This paper considers investment accumulation and pension adequacy in light of financial market risk. We examine two alternative reforms of the U.S. pension system that are aimed at pre-funding part of future pension liabilities and increasing national saving. The first policy expands the role of advance funding in the existing Social Security system by moving toward a policy of tax increases that are large enough to maintain close actuarial balance over a 75-year horizon. Under the alternative policy, the traditional Social Security program adopts pay-as-you-go financing after 2033 and a new system of individual investment accounts is adopted to supplement (reduced) pensions under the traditional system. Advance funding takes place in the new individual investment account system.The findings reported in this paper show the implications of investing part of the pension fund accumulation in assets which are subject to significant financial market risk. A major conclusion is that the magnitude of financial risk is empirically quite large. Surprisingly, some of the risks connected with advance funding can be even greater when assets are accumulated within the traditional Social Security program rather than individual investment accounts. Although advance funding in Social Security holds out the promise of raising national saving and future output even more than fund accumulation in individual accounts, the variability of returns on Trust Fund investments can have more far-reaching effects on the aggregate economy, through its potential impact on national savings, returns on capital, and the average wages. For example, a sequence of unexpectedly high investment returns on Trust Fund reserves might induce policymakers to reduce the Social Security contribution rate, lessening the flow of net savings from Trust Fund accumulation. The reduced rate of saving would in turn slow the growth of the capital stock, possibly increasing the real return on capital and reducing still further the required contribution rate for Social Security.
- – 2002-07-01
- – application/pdf
Implications of the Bush Commission Reforms for Married Couples
description- – In December 2001 the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security published a report describing plans to reform Social Security through the introduction of new, privately managed, defined-contribution pension accounts. The new accounts are to be financed by diverting a portion of payroll taxes that are now used to finance pensions under the existing defined-benefit public pension system. This paper evaluates the overall impact of the Commission's second plan on the distribution of retirement income and rates of return on pension contributions within and among future generations of married couples.
- – 2003-02-01
- – application/pdf
Supply-Side Consequences of Social Security Reform: Impacts on Saving and Employment
description- – Pension reform can potentially increase saving and improve incentives for labor force participation later in life. We investigate whether these effects are likely to occur and the potential size of the effects on private and total saving and on employment past age 55. Our survey of existing evidence and new empirical analysis focus on three issues: The possible reduction in other government saving if more assets are accumulated in a public retirement program; the reduction in non-pension private saving if assets are accumulated in new private retirement accounts; and the increase in old-age labor supply that could occur if Social Security benefits are reduced.We find mixed evidence that faster accumulation of assets in public or private retirement funds would produce higher public and private saving. Using the most optimistic estimates of the public saving response to faster accumulation in public retirement funds, we find advance funding will cause a big increase in aggregate saving and future national income. However, international evidence suggests governments are likely to offset a large percentage of public pension fund accumulation by reducing saving in other government accounts. The evidence on private saving suggests that savers tend to offset faster accumulation of assets in pension accounts with lower saving in non-pension accounts. Most empirical estimates of the labor supply response to Social Security reductions imply the response will be small. Even using unrealistically high estimates of responsiveness, we find that a one-third cut in benefits will add less than 3 percent to the future labor force.
- – 2004-01-01
- – application/pdf
Why Don't Americans Save?
description- – This paper provides an examination of the decline in the household saving rate over the past two decades from both the macroeconomic and microeconomic perspectives. Between 1980-84 and 2000-04 private saving fell more than 8 percentage points of U.S. GDP. At the aggregate level, about 40 percent of the fall in the household saving rate occurred within contractual retirement accounts, that is, within employer-sponsored and individual retirement plans. Moreover, much of the drop in discretionary saving occurred before the sharp rise in equity and home values in the late 1990s. The paper examines the potential scope of a number of other explanations for the fall in aggregate saving, such as the drop in inflation, increased capital gains on wealth, and alternative treatments of consumer durables as investment. Lower rates of inflation do emerge as a possible cause of the drop in measured saving, but the other factors do not seem consistent with the observed timing of the decline.The microeconomic section explores the feasibility of using information from successive Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF) to follow the wealth accumulation of specific age cohorts over the period of most dramatic change in aggregate saving. For many components of wealth, the surveys are very similar to the corresponding aggregates of the flow of funds accounts (FFAs), but there are important discrepancies for corporate equities that become particularly large for the 2001 survey. The discrepancies in the nominal wealth are magnified when the two estimates are adjusted for capital gains, yielding substantially different estimates of household saving. The paper reports on some efforts to benchmark the SCF to the FFAs, using the distributional information of the SCF to provide an added dimension to the FFA data. The resulting microeconomic data indicate a widespread drop in saving that cannot be associated with any specific group of households.
- – WP2004-26
- – 2004-11-01
- – application/pdf
The Decline in Household Saving: What Can We Learn from Survey Data?
description- – We examine the saving decline from the perspective of microeconomic survey data on the wealth position of American households. Can the surveys provide information on the nature and causes of the saving decline that are not evident in the macroeconomic information? The analysis concentrates on data obtained from six Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF) covering the period of 1983-2001. The SCF had a panel dimension only in the 1983-89 period. We conclude that the 1983-89 panel survey is a very valuable, but often ignored, exercise in measuring saving behavior. It is particularly instructive in demonstrating the heterogeneous nature of saving behavior and the dominant role of high-income households. Unfortunately, the panel component of the survey was discontinued after 1989. We conclude that cohort-based estimates of saving that can be derived from successive rounds of the SCF cross-section are not effective substitutes for a panel survey. The most substantial opportunity to improve our knowledge of the reasons for the decline in household saving would be to repeat the 1989 exercise by re-interviewing a portion of the households in each SCF survey.
- – 2005-12-01
- – application/pdf
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